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 Feeling so Hood. Rap, Lifestyles, and the Neighbourhood Imaginary in Tunisia 
  
 
Abstract 
 
The article examines the role of rap in reimagining the social structure in Tunisia after its 2010/2011 
revolution. Before the revolution, the Ben Ali regime imposed a narrative of Tunisian society as 
mainly middle class; beneath this narrative, the Tunisian folklore hosted multiple markers of social 
distinction that classified people through their perceived lifestyles: residence, language habits, 
consumption patterns, religious attitudes. Disadvantaged neighbourhoods were obliterated by the 
official narrative, and condemned to social spite by the unofficial ones. After the revolution, the 
success of rap came to ‘represent’ those quarters and the youth that inhabited them: rappers sang the 
hoods by criticizing their hard conditions and, at the same time, glorifying the hoods themselves. The 
vagueness of the social narratives in the country allowed rap musicians to manipulate both the image 
of the poor neighbourhoods and the idioms of social difference circulating in Tunisia: through this 
manipulation, they provided a new dignity to the most marginalized sectors of Tunisian society. At 
the same time, by representing the hoods, rappers could claim social capital and credibility as the 
‘true’ narrators of the new Tunisia. But the reimagination of social narratives was not enough to 
improve the life conditions of dispossessed youth. 
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Introduction 
 
 
We live like trash in the dustbin, 
I am so poor, I don’t have a penny, 
I don’t wake up early in the morning, 
I don’t even know what a watch is, 
This place is suffocating, 
The atmosphere is so gloomy…1 
 
These lines come from Houmani (2013), a song by Tunisian artists Hamzaoui Med Amine and Kafon. 
Houmani is perhaps the most important phenomenon in contemporary Tunisian pop culture: as we 
will see, such an appeal is certainly connected to the revolution that, between 2010 and 2011, shook 
Tunisia and the world, initiating the so-called Arab Springs. At the time of my fieldwork in Tunisia, 
between 2014 and 2015, it was seemingly impossible not to listen to the song. Houmani was blasted 
by the speakers of car radios, open air shops, lounge bars; children in the slums of Tunis sang it by 
heart, as did the bourgeois who crowded the disco clubs of the Tunisian coast. In the month of 
                                                 
1 All translations were made by the author with the help of two research participants, Sofiane Mabrouk and Inel Tarfa. 
Lyrics are not presented here in their literal translation; the author took care of their adaptation to English.  
September 2016, the song had about 26 million views on YouTube – that is, around two and a half 
times the population of Tunisia2. 
This transversal success is all the more intriguing if we consider the song’s theme: Houmani narrates 
the life of youth in the houma (plur. hwem), a Tunisian word that designates the local neighbourhoods, 
in particular the ‘traditional’ ones – those termed, in French, les quartiers populaires. While the word 
houma does not strictly refer to the slums, it often indicates areas marked by a strong local identity, a 
community-centred lifestyle, and modest economic conditions. Hence, the concept of houma did not 
designate a purely physical space: it rather resembled the concept of neighbourhood ideated by Arjun 
Appadurai – that is, the ambit in which locality is produced as a structure of feeling, as a form of 
interpersonal proximity3.  
Such a designation is evident in Houmani: the song title is a neologism that indicates somebody living 
in the houma and experiencing its life conditions, marked by poverty, boredom, and inanition. Such 
a theme is underlined by the song video as well: the clip, which costed only 250 Tunisian dinars (less 
than 100 euros), portrays episodes of street life in Ariana, a city in the North-Western suburbs of 
Tunis4. The guest singer Kafon himself came to represent the ideal houmani: a guy of humble origins 
who, between 2013 and 2014, served a 10 months sentence in jail for marijuana possession. Kafon 
thus embodied, at the same time, the destiny of street youth repressed by the police for their lifestyle, 
and the contiguous one of rappers implicitly harassed by the police because of their art. 
Houmani is the product – and the narrative – of some socio-cultural phenomena that were unthinkable 
before the revolution. It signifies the controversial emergence of rap as an important ‘pop’ 
commentary of the new Tunisia5, and, at the same time, the appearance of disadvantaged youth and 
the houma as key loci of Tunisian post-revolutionary history. In this article, I will analyse the 
connection between these two phenomena, a connection that has in Houmani only its most 
‘mainstream’ example. I will illustrate how rap has been constructed as ‘the voice of the houma’ and 
some of the consequences of this identification between rap and the youth from the neighbourhoods. 
Singing the hwem was, for Tunisian rappers, a source of symbolic capital. At the same time, the houma 
narrative implied a play with the signifiers of Tunisian social structure (in particular, with the lifestyles 
circulating in Tunisia). Such a play worked as a precarious technique of empowerment for rappers 
and disadvantaged youth, and in so doing it revealed some features of Tunisian society itself. 
The article aims to use the frameworks and methodologies of the sociology of youth cultures and 
popular music in order to understand, from an original point of view, the social, cultural, and political 
context of post-revolutionary Tunisia. It is part of a broader research project about the local rap, metal, 
and electro music scenes:. the use of scene I make hererefers to the conceptualization of music scenes 
within the debate on youth subcultures and post-subcultures6. In that sense, a scene can be seen as a 
                                                 
2Houmani’s video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mz3p3a4EiXA Accessed 9/11/2016. 
3Arjun Appadurai, Modernity al large: cultural dimensions of globalization, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1996). 
4“"Houmani": un rap sur la pauvreté se transforme en phénomène de société”, Les Observateurs 15/11/2013 
http://observers.france24.com/fr/20131115-tunisie-houmani-hamzaoui-kafon-rap-pauvrete-transforme-phenomene 
Accessed 4/11/2016. 
5A non-Tunisian listener might be puzzled by the identification of Houmani as a rap song. The track actually sounds more 
as a crossover of dancehall reggae and dubstep, modeled on the success Make it bun dem by Skrillex and Damian 
Marley. Still, perhaps due to the already established rap career of Hamzaoui Med Amine, the song was popularly 
considered a rap anthem, and so it was represented in the media. Members of the rap scene overtly polemized against 
this identification, and reputed the success of Kafon as an insult against the “real” Tunisian rap scene. 
6Andy Bennett and Keith Kahn-Harris, eds. After subculture. Critical studies in contemporary youth culture 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2004). 
space of cultural practices connecting musicians, infrastructures – such as record labels, venues, 
fanzines, political institutions and the like – and listeners, in a reciprocally influential fashion7. 
The data I will present come from an eleven months fieldwork that I carried out in Tunisia between 
2014 and 2015, exploring the rap scene along with the metal and electro ones. Data come from 
interviews with rappers and other members of the rap scene; from participant observation at concerts, 
open mics, recording studios, cafes, and everyday life on the streets; and from the analysis of media 
sources such as social network sites and newspaper articles. I will now describe the upsurge of the 
Tunisian rap scene and collocate it into the post-revolutionary panorama. An outline of the Ben Ali 
regime’s political economy will then help contextualizing local understandings of Tunisian lifestyles 
and social structure. I will thus analyze the role of rap in rethinking those understandings, and I will 
conclude the paper by describing the limits of rap as a tool for the re-imagination of Tunisian society. 
 
 
Rap and revolution 
 
On the 17th of September 2010, police sequestered the fruit and vegetables cart of Tarek Mohammed 
Bouazizi, a young informal vendor from the city of Sidi Bouzid, in the dispossessed inland of Tunisia. 
Bouazizi reacted out of frustration, and set himself on fire – he would die two weeks later. The self-
immolation of the young street vendor immediately caused a wave of protests that, within a month, 
expanded from the Centre and South of Tunisia to reach the well-off coastal area and the  most 
important cities, including the capital Tunis. The president Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, who had governed 
the country for 23 years, initially reacted by violently repressing the protests. However, he  would 
capitulate on the 14th of January 2011, when he flew off Tunisia. A complex phase of regime change 
thus began: Tunisia became a multi-party democracy troubled by economic problems, authoritarian 
temptations, and the constant menace of jihadi terrorism8. 
Revolts spurred off the condition of social exclusion suffered by the internal regions of the country, 
and from the failure of the regime in integrating a growing mass of unemployed in the economic 
system. The uprising had started as a demand for bread and jobs, but soon became a political cry for 
more democracy and the end of the Ben Ali regime. Along this process, it came to integrate different 
sectors of Tunisian society and their requests, coalescing them around the common fight against the 
political establishment. Tunisians felt that the Ben Ali dictatorship had taken their dignity away: the 
term ‘dignity’ meant different things to those who revolted – unemployed youth, anti-regime 
cyberactivists, Islamist militants, or the Tunis lawyers. However, it came to signify a common cause, 
and thus provided a ground for the desectorialization of the protests and the making of a mass 
movement9. 
Rap entered the epic of the Tunisian revolution during the last days of the regime. Hamada Ben Amor, 
a rapper known as El General, published his song Rayes Lebled (Head of the State) in December 
201010: the song was an open letter to Ben Ali, in which the rapper called the president on the injustice 
and poverty that were strangling the country. Rayes Lebled was not the first protest song written by a 
Tunisian rapper; however, it resonated with the mounting protests and became a hymn of the revolts 
                                                 
7On scenes, see Keith Kahn-Harris, Extreme metal: Music and culture on the edge (London: Berg, 2006); Geoff Stahl, 
‘ “It's Like Canada Reduced”: Setting the Scene in Montreal’ in After Subculture (see note 4), 
8Larbi Chouika and Eric Gobe, Histoire de la Tunisie depuis l'indépendance (Paris: La Découverte, 2015). 
9Michael Bechir Ayari, ‘Des maux de la misère aux mots de la “dignité”’. Revue Tiers Monde 5 (2011) 209-217 
10Rayes Lebled’s video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7yPZE313mk8 Accessed 9/11/2016. 
that were spreading through the Middle East and North Africa. The song became iconic with the arrest 
of El General, on the 6th of January. Ben Amor came to be recognized as one of the ‘heroes’ of the 
so-called Arab Spring; international media started to identify rap as the music of the Middle Eastern 
protests. At the end of 2011, the American magazine Time collocated El General among the most 
influential characters of the year11. The international fame of El General has been widely criticized 
in the Tunisian rap scene: many rappers contested the credibility of Ben Amor, claiming that he had 
come from nowhere and was not representative of the scene itself, nor he was particularly skilled as 
an artist. These criticisms would become fiercer after the revolution, when El General pursued his 
career as an Islamic rapper, and used his music to campaign for political parties12. Still, Rayes Lebled 
came at the right moment, propelling the appeal of Tunisian rap in the country and to audiences 
abroad. 
Another effect of the Tunisian revolution proved important for the upsurge of the Tunisian rap scene. 
At the eve of his resignation, Ben Ali made one last attempt to quench the protests: in his last 
television speech, he claimed that he had ‘understood’ the protesters, and proposed a series of 
measures in order to democratize the country and contrast poverty and unemployment. Among those 
measures, one was immediately enforced: the end of Internet censorship. Since the night of the 13th 
of January 2011, an array of websites that used to be accessible only through proxies (such as anti-
regime or porn sites) became legal. Censorship was lifted off YouTube, making it the fundamental 
vehicle for the diffusion of rap music in Tunisia. 
.,  A small rap scene already existed in Tunisia before 2011. The scene had even produced a veritable 
star: Balti, who had been the godfather of underground Tunisian rap before crossing over to the 
mainstream music industry and even singing for the president Ben Ali13. However, in the 2000s rap 
was mostly a submerged reality: concerts were rare, and songs had a limited diffusion, as videoclips 
on the Facebook accounts of artists or as MP3s that could be downloaded from specialized online 
forums. Through YouTube, the rap scene has proved able to reach a mass audience that was just 
unthinkable in the pre-revolutionary period. A generation of young rappers who had surfaced in the 
last part of the decade – MCs such as Klay BBJ, Vipa, Weld el 15, Madou MC, Phenix, Medusa – 
arose to unprecedented fame. Videos by Klay, Hamzaoui, or Sanfara went over one million views in 
                                                 
11On El General and his recognition, see Nouri Gana, ‘Rap and Revolt in the Arab World’, Social Text no. 30 (2012), 
25-53; Yves Gonzalez-Quijano, ‘Le nouvel orientalisme et les jeunes rebelles: les rappeurs de la scène arabe’, 
Contretemps, 2013 http://www.contretemps.eu/interventions/nouvel-orientalisme-jeunes-rebelles-rappeurs-
sc%C3%A8ne-arabe Accessed 10/11/2016. 
12 By “Islamic rapper” I refer, here, to a wave of rappers singing themes related to political Islam and religion in a broader 
sense. The most influent example of this kind of rap , in north Africa, is the Algerian MC Lotfi Double Kanon, whom 
many of my informants claimed as an inspiration. Tunisian rappers such as Psyco-M, C.A.S.A., or Guito-N often 
sang lyrics on political islam, anti-islamic global plots, infra-Islamic controversies (such as the critique of Wahabism 
from a Muslim point of view). Some of these artists enjoyed direct support from the Islamic party Ennahdha. Such 
rappers where sometimes criticized by members of the rap scene for their message-centered rap: according to their 
critics, Islamic rappers did not pay enough attention to technique and poetry, and thus devalued rap music in an artistic 
sense. Others criticized these rappers for being corrupted and dependent on the money of political parties. However, 
it would be hard to consider Islamic rappers a coherent sub-scene, especially since Islamic references were present 
in many songs of rappers that did not subscribe to the category of “Islamic rappers”. On this theme, see Souad Halila, 
‘Rap and Islamism in post-revolutionary Tunisia: Local idiosyncrasies and global reverberations’, in Islamism and 
Cultural Expression in the Arab world, ed. Abir Hamdar and Lindsey Moore (London: Routledge, 2015), 222-238. 
On the relationship between rap and political parties in Tunisia, see  Henda Chennaoui, ‘Elections 2014: 
L’underground tunisien récupéré par le politique?’, Nawaat, 19/11/2014, 
http://nawaat.org/portail/2014/11/19/elections-2014-lunderground-tunisien-recupere-par-le-politique/ Accessed 
10/11/2016. 
13Kerim Bouzouita, ‘Underground et mainstream: anthropologie des dominations et des résistances musicales’. (PhD 
diss., Université Paris VIII, 2013). 
one week; rappersfigured in prime time TV shows14, and were sometimes represented as ‘the real 
voice of the streets’ – much more credible, among Tunisian youth, than the politicians of the new 
democratic establishment. 
YouTube structured the rap scene, the music, and its circulation. ‘Views’ on the website became the 
currency of the scene: rappers existed only insofar as they were on YouTube, and their careers were 
intimately tied to the performance and diffusion of their clips. Consequently, musicians focused on 
producing singles and videos rather than entire albums. The role of YouTube as a central node of the 
scene made success in Tunisian rap a mainly virtual affair. Only few artists could monetize their 
YouTube success15, or played live often enough to make a living out of their concert schedule. The 
undeveloped state of the local rap music industry resulted, for most rappers, in a separation between 
celebrity and commercial success. In this situation, some artists sought parallel forms of revenue: 
street hustles and drug dealing; liaisons with political parties (for example, singing at party rallies); 
or participation in the development and capacity building sector (for example, being paid by 
international NGOs in order to organize workshops on urban culture for disadvantaged children)16. 
Hence, the vitality of the post-revolutionary rap scene was marked by a series of ambiguities and 
contradictions. The fame of rappers coexisted with their economic marginalization. Their credibility 
and popularity were counterbalanced by an atmosphere of social suspicion and moral panic. If rappers 
represented the street, they carried its stigma as well: they had a reputation for being drug dealers and 
violent thugs, and their speech (marked by swear words and a street-savvy use of Tunisian dialect) 
was reputed vulgar and insulting. Politics courted rappers and tried to profit from their cultural capital, 
but at the same time MCs often encountered fierce repression due to their lifestyle habits (for example, 
drug consumption and street life) and their musical attacks against the police and the ruling class. The 
list of rappers persecuted since 2011 (that is, in the time of ‘democratization’) is disturbingly long: 
Volcanis Le Roi, Weld El 15, Lady Sam, Madou MC, Emino, Phenix, T-MC, (beatmaker) Brown, 
Killa MC, Klay BBJ, Kafon are only some of the rap musicians arrested after the revolution. In most 
cases, rappers have been imprisoned for drug-related offences (smoking a single joint usually caused 
a one year prison sentence). However, many local activists usually connected crime-related arrests or 
police harassment with a will to punish artistic dissent, or, more in general, the lifestyles of youth 
from the Houma17.   The most famous case of imprisonment, however, concerned rapper Weld el 15, 
arrested several times for his anti-police song Boulicia Kleb (Policemen are dogs, 2013)18. 
The ambiguous condition of the rap scene homologically mirrored the one of the disadvantaged hwem 
and their youth. As with rappers, youth from the neighbourhoods were caught between celebration as 
                                                 
14 For example, the popular prime time show “Labes”, on the channel El Hiwar Ettounsi, hosted many famous MCs, such 
as Madou, Klay, or Vipa. The latter even became the protagonist of a comedy TV series in which he interpreted 
himself.  
15 Youtube monetization has been rendered possible in Tunisia only in 2014. See “4 ans de YouTube en Tunisie, ça se 
fête !”, Tanitweb, 24/12/2014, <http://blog.tanitweb.com/4-ans-de-youtube-en-tunisie-ca-se-fete/>.  Accessed 
01/03/2017. Still most Tunisian rappers could not  earn money from their youTube videos. This happened in particular  
because of the poor enforcement of author’s rights in the country: as a result, most local rappers could not claim 
authorship  on their own songs. See [reference removed]. 
16For a broader analysis of the economy of the Tunisian rap scene, see [reference removed] 
17 On some of these cases, see  Julie Green, ‘Le Long Combat du Rap Tunisien’, SURL Magazine,  28/11/2015. 
http://www.surlmag.fr/rap-tunisien-emino-2015/  Accessed 3/3/2017.  
18Boulicia Kleb’s video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6owW_Jv5ng4. Accessed 21/10/2016. On the Weld el 15 
affair, see ‘Weld El 15, Verdict: 6 mois avec sursis’, Huffington Post Maghreb, 
2/7/2013.http://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2013/07/02/weld-el-15-libere_n_3532403.html?ref=topbar.Accessed 
21/10/2016. 
the heroes of 2011, and an everyday life of stigma and marginalization. In the next section I will trace 
the genealogy of this ambiguous condition. 
 
 
Beyond the Tunisian miracle 
 
During the regime era, low income quarters and their population were quasi-invisible. The slums’ 
invisibility was constructed by the regime and, in turn, constructed the regime itself, by guaranteeing 
popular consent. Such a construction served a narrative that celebrated Tunisia as an economic and 
cultural exception in the MENA region. The Tunisian political establishment, and its allies in Europe 
and the United States, boasted about the ‘European’ growth rate of the country, its tolerant Islam and 
secular society, and the mild character of the regime itself, which appeared on a slow but gradual path 
towards effective democracy. 
Béatrice Hibou19 has showed how the narrative of the “Tunisian exception” constituted the main 
instrument of regime power in the country, way beyond the – however capillary and fierce – 
repressive apparatus constituted by the police and the cells of Ben Ali’s party, the RCD (Democratic 
Constitutional Rally). The foreign sponsors of the regime – in particular the United States of America, 
the European Union, and organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank – considered Tunisia as 
the ‘model pupil’ of neoliberalism. According to its allies, the country had well received the structural 
adjustment plans imposed on Tunisia by the end of the 1980s and it had been able to turn the neoliberal 
recipes into an asset for economic growth and democratic progress. Moreover, Ben Ali’s repression 
of radical Islamists (who constituted the main opposition force in Tunisia) reassured Western 
countries in the post-9/11 age of fear. 
According to Hibou, the successful economic performance of Tunisia was actually obtained through 
the constant and meticulous manipulation of figures and growth indexes. This play on figures was the 
basis of a tacit ‘security pact’ between the regime and its dominated. The pact affirmed the presence 
of the State and the ruling party as a protection against crime, Islamic terrorism, social and economic 
insecurity: the political system existed by promising growth, stability, and dreams of modern and 
‘western-like’ consumption. 
The ‘invisibility’ of poverty and social difference was a consequence of such promises: the regime 
shaped an ideological view of Tunisia as an overwhelmingly middle class country. According to this 
narrative, almost every Tunisian belonged to the middle classes: sociologist Baccar Gherib shows 
how official data considered the middle classes to account for 80% of the population in 2010. The 
ideology of Tunisia as a middle class country was engineered through an ad hoc use of survey 
instruments, so that the category of middle class used by the government was extremely vast. This 
skewed representation of the Tunisian class system was also upheld due to the concomitant absence 
of any independent academic research or surveys focusing on the class system in Tunisia20. However, 
the regime went beyond shaping a narrative: it constructed this middle class population – a population 
that considered itself middle class, desired being middle class, and had middle class dreams of 
consumption – through the levers of debt and inclusion into the public sector and into relations of 
clientelism. Tunisians owed their perspectives of economic wellbeing and social reproduction to bank 
                                                 
19Béatrice Hibou, La Force de l’obéissance: Economie politique de la répression en Tunisie (Paris: La Découverte, 
2006). 
20Baccar Gherib, ‘Les classes moyennes tunisiennes entre mythe et réalité. Éléments pour une mise en perspective 
historique’, L’Année du Maghreb no. 7 (2011), 419-435. 
credit and to instruments of informal welfare put in place by the State – such as the infamous 26.26., 
a service of national charity extorted from the population21. 
The other side of the security pact was constituted by the omni-presence of the State and party 
apparatus. The regime penetrated every level of the country’s public life. Tunisians were constantly 
monitored, and mistrusted each other as potential spies; they needed ties with the establishment in 
order to accomplish even the most mundane economic goals. Informal connections with State and 
party representatives were the key to launch a professional activity and to bypass the law – which 
was necessary due to the strangling, repressive character of bureaucracy. In turn, this situation of 
dependence put every citizen at risk of being denounced, and thus reinforced fear as a tool for 
consensus. These two sides of the security pact maintained social peace in the country, at least until 
cracks in the system were revealed, in the form of ‘middle classes’ who could not sustain their 
standards of living anymore, due to the deterioration of the national economy, the narrowing down of 
social mobility patterns, and heavy indebtment in a time of worldwide economic crisis. The Tunisian 
revolution can, indeed, be understood as a consequence of the rupture of the security pact22. 
 
Lifestyles in the hood 
 
The representation of Tunisian society as middle class-centred equated to a representation of 
classlessness. Poverty and its hubs were concealed by the regime, or considered a residual evil that 
would soon be defeated. In the political rhetoric, and in the media, the disadvantaged hwem were at 
the same time nests of criminal activity and informal economy, and less developed niches that would 
soon be integrated in the national progress by the civilizing mission of the regime23. But in pre-
revolutionary Tunisia being from the slums often meant suffering stigma and exclusion. When a youth 
from poor quarters of Tunis such as Sidi Hassin or cité Ettadhamen went to the city centre for a walk 
on the central Avenue Bourguiba, it was not rare for him to be stopped by police, have his documents 
checked, and be sent back to his neighbourhood. According to Selim24, a rapper from the Melassine 
neighbourhood: 
 
Still to this day, when I hang around downtown, police check my ID card, they see that I'm from here, 
and they're like “Melassine? What are you doing here? What are you looking for?” Though we're like 
15 minutes away from the centre, we are in the centre. It hasn't changed after the revolution [Interview: 
Selim, 19/3/2015. Translated from French]. 
 
Therefore, the narrative of classlessness was matched by practices of exclusion that blended the 
concealment of poverty with the overt repression and obliteration of the poor. This blend of 
invisibility and repression caused the Tunisian social structure to be imagined by Tunisians in a 
curiously paradoxical way: on the one side, everybody was ‘middle class’; on the other, a folklore of 
representations of inequality, expressed by symbolic and allusive languages, permeated the Tunisian 
ethos. 
                                                 
21Hibou, La Force de l’obéissance. (see note 15) 
22Béatrice Hibou, ‘Tunisie. Économie politique et morale d'un mouvement social’, Politique africaine vol.121 no.1 
(2011), 5-22. 
23Olfa Lamloum and Mohammed Ali Ben Zina (eds.), Les jeunes de Douar Hicher et d'Ettadhamen. Une enquête 
sociologique (Tunis: Éditions Arabesques, 2015). 
24All personal names have been changed in order to protect the privacy of informants. 
These representations of social difference were articulated through a range of ambiguous 
determinants: the neighbourhood or the city of origin; language habits (whether emphasizing Tunisian 
dialect, modern standard Arabic, or French); modes of consumption (for example, the habit of buying 
groceries at “traditional” open-air markets or at expensive French supermarket chains). In the area of 
the capital city, the coastal suburb of La Marsa, that hosted many expatriates and intellectuals, was 
“naturally” considered a sophisticated and progressive place, and so were its inhabitants; on the 
contrary, neighbourhoods such as the dispossessed Jbel Jelloud were widely reputed poor and 
dangerous. Practices such as blogging or the passion for electronic music stereotypically identified a 
youth as a member of the progressive, intellectual, francophone elite. Tunisians from the South were 
seen as comically backwards, and their accent and supposed gullibility were parodied in TV shows. 
The new Islamic bourgeoisies had distinctive modes of consumption: they frequented 
neighbourhoods and specific leisure spaces whose aesthetics and features were unlike the nightlife 
zones and the bars that the secular bourgeoisie attended. 
Such elements of social difference are perhaps common to every society, but in Tunisian society they 
were peculiarly strong, because of factors such as the heritage of French colonization and the 
persisting cultural influence of France, the uneven development of the interior regions and the coastal 
ones, and the diffusion of ‘post-Islamic’25 lifestyles and sensibilities. Furthermore, those distinctions 
were aggravated by the political obliteration of social inequality. Their character seemed ‘fixed’, 
solid, although in practice they referred to vague and elastic markers of distinction. Reality was, 
indeed, more complicated than the stereotypes suggested. While a certain neighbourhood was socially 
imagined as exclusively rich or poor, in reality it was always characterized by a certain degree of 
social stratification. On the cultural level, most Tunisians blended bourgeois and ‘popular’ forms of 
consumption, as well as secular and Islamic cultural suggestions, or western and local influences. But 
still, those distinctions held a structural significance and acted as a key for Tunisians to imagine the 
variety of lifestyles in their country. 
Lifestyles are a classic sociological concept, whose usages go back to pioneers such as Weber26 and 
Simmel27: the first of these theorists saw lifestyles as modes of life and consumption that are status-
related, and thus varying within the same social class; the second considered lifestyles as articulations 
of the tension between individuality and universality28. A different approach to lifestyles is offered by 
Pierre Bourdieu29: for him, lifestyles are precise sets of tastes, life conducts, and interests. Class 
belonging, and thus one's access to economic and cultural capital, is at the basis of the formation of 
different types of habitus; in turn, each habitus is at the basis of the formation of different lifestyles, 
all of which mirror certain individual dispositions as a fruit of the habitus, and work themselves as 
material exhibitions of one's economic and cultural capital. Lifestyles have also been applied more 
recently as a crucial analytical tool in youth culture studies. The point of reference is here David 
Chaney, who saw lifestyles as collective identities, and yet tailored to the individual, developed 
through the creative, ironic, and reflexive use of consumption30. We can see how, in most scholarly 
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usages, lifestyles represent an understanding of social difference that opposes, or nuances, class 
analyses. While class, in the Marxist sense, is about relations of production, lifestyle is about actual 
sets of social behaviour (such as taste in consumption or everyday habits) and their role in fashioning 
identities. Scholars who prize lifestyles over class consider the latter a deterministic marker of social 
identities, and prefer lifestyles as more indeterminate (and yet more empirically noticeable) signifiers 
of identity and difference. 
The lifestyles framework proves an interesting angle for the analysis of Tunisian society, because it  
highlights the connection between two social dynamics. On the one side, lifestyles are a perfect 
representation of the undetermined and consumption-based idioms of difference circulating within 
Tunisian social narratives. On the other side, they help picturing the identity-making processes and 
the agency displayed within global youth cultures and music scenes31. I argue that the global hip 
hop/rap culture offered its Tunisian practitioners some cultural instruments which helped them 
playing with the cultural repertoire of social differences embodied in Tunisian lifestyles. Tunisian 
scenesters thus had the possibility to reformulate the stereotypes of social inequality in the language 
of their scene, and thus obtain subcultural capital. This term, coined by Sarah Thornton on the basis 
of Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital, designates the availability of symbolic goods and credibility 
within a youth subculture or a music scene: the distribution of these resources within a scene 
distinguishes the most cool and underground members from simple parvenus32. 
Tunisian music scenes developed ethnosociologies: scene-specific accounts of how society worked, 
and where other scenes fit within the social structure. Ethnosociologies were thus instruments, for the 
members of the rap scene, to collocate themselves in the space of their scene and of society in general. 
These possibilities rested precisely on the ambiguities of Tunisian social structure and the lifestyles 
it articulated. Since those lifestyles were formulated in the rather vague terms of residence, language, 
and cultural taste, they guaranteed wider margins of manoeuvre than the more deterministic discourse 
of class belonging. I will now offer two empirical examples of this phenomenon. 
While Tunisian rappers tended to identify themselves with the youth from disadvantaged quarters, 
their social backgrounds were actually diverse. Also, many of my informants underlined the fact that 
Tunisian rappers often had a school degree, which, in their opinion, clearly distinguished local rappers 
from the standard MCs struggling in the American ghettoes33. To be sure, during my research I have 
met more lowclass youth in the rap scene than in the metal or the electro scenes, but still the self-
ascription of rappers among the poor and unemployed was in many cases a conscious cultural strategy. 
The self-identification of rappers as wled el houma (sons of the houma) worked as a means – although 
not necessarily a conscious one – to express street credibility and social critique. 
The other example concerns the relationship between the rap scene and the ‘alternative’/intellectual 
milieu of Tunis – that is, the cultural scene that connected artists, cyberactivists, left-wing intellectuals 
and the like. Although it was impossible to trace its contours, this milieu was visible and commonly 
recognized by the frequenters of the underground political and cultural worlds of the capital city. 
Many of its members came from the upper classes, had relevant qualifications, and expressed a 
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culturally cosmopolitan identity. And yet, some youth from less privileged backgrounds  frequented 
this milieu. Those youth often had access to the milieu through their display of an artist lifestyle and 
the use of subcultural capital. For instance, the cultural and political reputation of rappers made them 
cool acquaintances in the eyes of some of the capital city hipsters – although their actual lifestyle was 
more akin to the ‘sons of the houma’ than to the intellectual bourgeoisie. Some Tunisian youth 
represented themselves as ‘freelance artists’ and thus expressed their contiguity with that cultural 
scene, while they were actually unemployed and made a living out of friends’ loans and marginal 
activities in the milieu itself, such as dealing drugs or working as security staff at cultural events (both 
functions often fulfilled by rappers). 
These examples show how the play onone’s youth cultural lifestyle allowed her to play onthe social 
structure at large – or, at least, on its defining narratives. While post-revolutionary Tunisia inherited 
its discourse on social differences from the regime era, these practices that reshaped social 
imaginaries helped the gradual redefinition of that discourse; although, as we will see, this effort of 
redefinition had its limits. In the next section I will describe the ways in which the rap scene used the 
houma and disadvantaged youth as tools for such lifestyle manipulation. 
 
 
Sons of the houma 
 
Tunisian rap did not invent the neighbourhood as a poetic topos. On the contrary, the hood is perhaps 
the most typical rap theme all over the world. The globalization of rap imposed to its practitioners an 
authenticity dilemma: should one keep it real by making music that portrays the truth of her daily life 
and thus “represents” her local setting, or should one stay authentic to the origins of hip hop culture, 
reinforcing her ties to the roots of American and global hip hop?34. Rapping about the houma provided 
a solution to this dilemma. The houma was the locus that articulated those two sources of authenticity: 
it connected the brutal truth of the everyday street experience with the discipline and knowledge – 
that is, the subcultural capital – of rap as a global narrative of the ghetto. The Tunisian neighbourhood 
was, at once, the unique setting of a rapper’s local life and a synecdoche for all the ghettoes in the 
world. This ambivalence had an extreme example in the music of rappers such as T-MC, from the 
dispossessed Cité Bechir, in the city of Mhamdia. T-MC rapped in English; his accent and slang 
mimicked American rap and his lyrics were not about strictly local topics, but could rather refer to 
the poor and the hoods of any country. And yet his videoclips, for example the one for the song 
Lifeless (2016)35, linked such a universal poetics to a context that was extremely close to the life 
experience of T-MC: the dismal streets of Mhamdia. When I interviewed T-MC, he explained to me 
how this very link between personal life and global art drove him towards rap: 
 
I figured out that the only way to take my life in my hands was the way of rap music, that this was the 
only thing I could describe myself into, through which I could describe the problems of my people. This 
is the only music, the only art, that can send my message to the world. I survive every day like this, 
fighting against the government and talking to my people, not only in English, but also in a very good 
literary Arabic [in the political video speeches that T-MC often published on his Facebook page]. But I 
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never sing in Arabic. I chose to talk to the world with my songs, and if I talk to the world I have to do 
it in English  [Interview: T-MC, 1/6/2015]. 
 
Other Tunisian artists used a different practice of localization of their music: what Murray Forman  
defines the extreme local36. The extreme local is the use of “micro” markers of residence and 
provenance such as postcodes, address numbers, names of neighbourhoods, codes of transport lines 
and the like. Through the extreme local, rappers ‘represent’ their place, and at the same time claim an 
identity that is strengthened by representation itself. Usage of the extreme local was visible all across 
the Tunisian rap scene: the crew from the Kabbariya quarter was called K.A.B.B.A.; artists like Klay 
and Phenix used the abbreviation BBJ in their stage names in order to signify their hood, Bab Jdid; 
the crew 24 All Stars referred to the bus line that travelled from Tunis to their headquarters in the city 
of Mourouj; the crew South School from the southern Gafsa region used many references that 
collocated it into the country’s inland. 
In some cases, the extreme local acts in the opposite way: rap projects its symbolization on the local 
environment – as when a crew marks its neighbourhood with graffiti. In the above-mentioned Bab 
Jdid houma, the reputation of rapper Klay BBJ (one of the most admired in Tunisia) strongly 
influenced neighbourhood life. Klay showed the streets of Bab Jdid in his very popular videos, and 
he talked about his people in the songs. Over time,  Klay BBJ became a symbol of Bab Jdid itself, 
reconfirming the reputation of rich folkloric and cultural production of the neighbourhood. 
The poetics of the houma rested on an ambivalence between the expression of hardship and the 
celebration of pride. This formula, itself not uncommon in global rap culture, mirrored the equally 
ambivalent narrative about disadvantaged youth in post-revolutionary Tunisia, both dismissive and 
celebratory. MCs sang the hood reality as one of deprivation, police harassment, daily violence. Its 
public space was marked by emptiness, cafes and mosques often being the only social spaces 
available. Rappers claimed to represent the protagonists of this space: the young men who ‘held the 
walls’ in a present of permanent waithood37. This social category had a recognizability beyond rap 
narratives: public and academic discourses characterized the sons of disadvantaged hwem as 
unemployed or casually employed men, aged from fourteen to thirty years old, unmarried, often living 
with their parents, incapable of succeeding in transitioning to adulthood because they could not afford 
the basic status symbols that marked this transition – basically, a house, a stable job, a wife38. They 
spent the day experiencing boredom, telling jokes or having fights with friends, and engaging in petty 
hustling. Women, in contrast, were less visible in the same spaces, and more confined in the space of 
home, school, or street markets.  
Some musicians framed this condition of emptiness and deprivation as a political design, with police 
as the material executor of such a design. Rappers commonly hated police. They did not consider 
policemen as a simple State emanation, but rather as corrupted persecutors of the neighbourhoods, 
who stormed the hwem in search of bribes and the pleasure of exerting power (one of my informants 
even called them ‘a concurrent gang’). The idea of the neighbourhood situation as a political 
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construction, and of police as the moral agents of it, is visible in the words of rapper Taher, from the 
Sidi Bechir hood in Tunis: 
 
It is the system that built this neighbourhood. It built the hood, and then it besieged it. There's the Sidi 
Bechir police station, there's another one up there… It's surrounded by police, I tell you. Police comes 
from… form Gorjani station for example, they come, I'd say, once or twice a day. They earn their money 
and then they go back, you see? They take their “commission”. It's basically a racket. And in all 
neighbourhoods it works like this [Interview: Taher, 8/8/2014. Translated from French]. 
 
At the same time, the hood was a source of pride. It was a social ambit marked by neighbourhood 
solidarity and warm interpersonal relations in the elsewhere cold social climate of the city39). Pride 
also came from hard living itself: some of my informants described this in terms of honour, the honour 
of coming from a place into which some of their compatriots would not dare to step. For others, the 
houma was just everything; they could not imagine their life anywhere else. As Kais, a rapper from 
Bab Jdid, put it: “I'm one of the people who came to know the world here. I opened my eyes here, 
most of my friends are here, my life is here, and I spend most of my time in here” [Interview: Kais, 
3/6/2015. Translated from Arabic]. 
The hood was thus lived as an integral reality whose pleasures and evils were inextricable. An 
example is the song L’Manfi (The Exile, 2014)40 by the group Empire, who represented the Bab el 
Fellah and Sidi Mansour neighbourhoods: 
 
We keep on advancing in places where guys of my age perish 
Those who come buy [drugs] in Sidi Mansour get robbed 
This quarter where all the money is hidden by the walls of Lucifer 
You get killed if you trespass your boundaries, everything is a game 
Like thugs 
We fuck our brains without any money and the dessert is chocolate [hashish] 
[…] 
I grew up moving, I concealed my cards 
Bab el Fellah is not a movie, wake up, you dormant 
Here, when a child wants candy, the adults make you drink boukha [a Tunisian liquor] 
It’s the language of the suqs [the open air markets], the harassment of the suqs 
[…] 
For the people of my quarter, Chiheb and Haha 
We live in a country where the system fishes us 
Bab el Fellah. We’ll only rest in our graves. 
 
The video for L’Manfi ends with a credits section citing several youth from the houma that Empire 
represented. A similar strategy appears in other videos, such as the one for Hchinahoulna (We fucked 
ourselves) by Klay BBJ and Phenix: the credit section attributes the direction of the clip to the wled 
el houma, and continues listing some of them who have contributed to the making of the video. The 
L’Manfi video is dedicated to Walid Denguir, a young man from Bab Jdid who died while he was 
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under police custody: while Denguir’s corpse showed traces of torture, authorities denied any police 
violence on the young man, and the coroner suggested ‘cannabis overdose’ as the cause for his death41. 
Walid Denguir is also the protagonist of another Empire video, Hommage – Walid Denguir (2013)42 
(a montage of scenes of police violence and the making of a graffiti portrait of Denguir in Bab Jdid), 
and of a song by Klay BBJ and Sniper MC called Hommage Denguir (2014)43. These songs and 
videos make the identification between the houma as a community place and the troubles of 
disadvantaged youth clear. Furthermore, they characterize the dispossessed hood as a victim of the 
institutions, and police as the nemesis of the local youth – Denguir, a criminal in the eyes of the 
authorities and in the media official discourse, is tributed and dignified, while police is bashed as an 
enemy. 
Pest, a young MC from Fouchana city, presented in his songs the same ambiguity between the houma 
as a warm place and the houma as a locus of struggle and misery. In Nafs al Mouaten (The Same 
Citizen, 2014)44 he describes the unchanging routine of a ‘son of the houma’; in Feeling so hood45 he 
sings the pain and the honour of living in a disadvantaged quarter: 
 
Evenings are full of sorrow, 
we never change the needle and bodies are filled with tattoos 
Tattoos and anxiety, it's become a burden 
He became an alcoholic – that's normal, we're always alright 
God, we left the bourgeois pile up [the money] 
[while] We are the ones who believe in honour and in the hoods, 
Prisoners are the poor, police is the responsible, 
Here, we burn the shit [hashish] 
One year of prison and a cowl-less Vespa, 
Drift away from checkpoints, 
Pantakol [glue] and Magic [methanol] fill the plastic bags, 
The group gathers on the street, 
Hunger pushes you to tear out by force, 
You are invited to Mornaguia [prison], 
Hard to find anybody [judicially] clean, 
Hard to find anybody weak, 
We are afraid of the one above [Allah] and not of you 
[…] 
The State seeks order, we seek vengeance. 
 
When I interviewed Pest, he was adamant in his refusal to live anywhere else than in the houma. He 
loved living in Fouchana, although life there was often hard, full of fights and police violence: 
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I could never live in El Menzah [a well-to-do suburb of Tunis], I hate chic quarters. I have a problem 
with the bourgeois, because they detest us, the poor. I hate the bourgeois, they're the main subject in my 
songs. I like living in my neighbourhood with the poor, that's a good life. I love my life here, I love my 
neighbourhood, I won't disown it. It's true, we have problems, but that's still the best possible life. I 
wouldn't like to be one of the rich. I'd only like to travel away in order to make music properly 
[Interview: Pest, 22/6/2015. Translated from Arabic]. 
 
.Another reason why the hood became the source of pride was linked to the revolution. Disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods were the hotbeds for the insurrection. This began in the inland regions, where social 
unrest was propagated from Sidi Bouzid. As the movement reached the bigger cities, including Tunis, 
the poorer neighbourhoods on the outskirts were the first places to revolt. Male youth in those quarters 
did not live the revolutionary moment simply as the overthrowing of a dictator; they saw it as a way 
of becoming mature and taking life in their own hands after a never-changing routine of social spite 
and lack of perspectives of realization. Through the organization of ‘neighbourhood committees’, 
boys started patrolling their quarters; they kept police and RCD militias away from their streets. As 
Amin Allal put it, politicization meant to them a way of becoming men: they used to be regarded as 
delinquents, and then they came to be celebrated as heroes46. 
Revolution can, indeed, be seen as an irruption of the houma youth into the national self-image of 
Tunisia. The long-neglected poor came to be, for an instant, the true political subject in the country's 
historical shift. In the aftermath of revolution, rap became the official language that celebrated the 
mythology of this event. Rap did not only celebrate the forgotten houma and denounce its problems; 
it also claimed the sons of the houma as protagonists, subjects, and narrators of the new Tunisia. 
Conversely, rappers felt invested by the houma youth as their official spokespersons, and as quasi-
political representatives. This reciprocity is visible in songs by rappers like Klay BBJ, Phenix, or 
Absy. An example is the song Hchinahoulna (2013) by Phenix and Klay BBJ47. Klay sings the line 
‘At the next elections, I will vote for the drug dealer from the houma’, while Phenix ends the song 
with the following words: 
 
Bab Jdid is in the place 
Politics in a suit, basically under it it’s all whores and transvestites 
When I insult you my people rejoice, insulting you is my bread 
Old men, our rap is more listened to than your president. 
 
In their song, Klay and Phenix stated a cleavage that was, at the same time, cultural, generational, 
and political. On the one side there were the youth from the houma, their urban lifestyles, and rap as 
their poetic expression and device of representation. On the other, ‘the system’, composed of old 
people whose power thirst was seen as the reason for the injustice governing the country. Both rappers 
sang from a markedly revolutionary point of view, one that urged the people to complete the 2011 
uprising by fighting the ‘democratic’ political establishment. And yet, in a sense, they pointed exactly 
at the paradox of post-revolutionary Tunisia. The surge of houma soundtracks, with tragic irony, 
ended up coinciding with a rapid new form of political and social marginalisation for disadvantaged 
youth. 
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Conclusion 
 
The hoods were celebrated for some months before earning a new stigma: the one of being cradles 
for terrorism48. Unemployment worsened, while the rate of youth participation in elections dropped. 
Youth were once again publicly represented as a problem, making it into the news only in relation to 
the denouncing of youth delinquency, arrests for cannabis smoking, jihadism, or violent unrest49. At 
the same time, discotheques in the exclusive Gammarth area hosted bourgeois youth singing along to 
Houmani. Kafon became a pop star, and he even participated in the 2014 presidential election by 
backing two candidates50. The rap scene produced an array of narratives that succeeded in reworking 
the social imaginary of post-revolutionary Tunisia, but the transformations of this imaginary could 
well overlap with the persistence of social marginalization. 
In addition to that, the whole exercise of ‘singing the houma’ existed upon an ambiguity: the tension 
between the vivid realism of the extreme local and the mythological idealtype of the hood and its 
youth. The houma was sung as a hypostasized, homogeneous reality: it was not rare for rappers to tell 
me: ‘I have no songs about my specific houma, but I sing about the houma in general’. This 
construction encompassed realities that had different histories, different social conditions, and were 
even different administrative entities (from bigger cités to tiny blocks). Furthermore, the houma was 
not a smooth space, but rather a socially complex and diverse environment – exactly as rappers 
represented disadvantaged youth, but were not necessarily disadvantaged themselves. 
Tunisians constructed the houma’s complexity by emphasizing one of the different elements that they 
usually ascribed to their neighbourhood: local identity, ‘traditional’ ways of life, urban hardship. The 
simultaneous or alternative evocation of these aspects helped producing the houma as a malleable 
idealtype, one that gave to its inhabitants a strong political identity. The link between the hood and 
Tunisian youth produced a distinctive form of sociability, separate from the urban elites and from the 
political establishment. As such, it claimed dignity as an attribute of the ‘grassroots’ Tunisia of the 
neighbourhoods. This claim of dignity was in line with the revolutionary battle: the honour and 
feelings of revenge sung by rappers in hood-centred songs belonged to the genealogy of the 
revolution. As for them, rappers turned their activity of representation of houma youth as a source of 
subcultural capital. 
The art of rapping about the neighbourhood displayed agency over the narrative of social difference 
in Tunisia. By producing a specifically hip hop ethnosociology, tt could manipulate the indeterminacy 
of the lifestyles expressed by the local ethos, and help reconfiguring the social narrative beyond the 
spite that had marked social relations under the Ben Ali regime. As a participant in the presidential 
elections of 2014 defined himself a houmani candidate51, as the narrative of the houma became 
glamorous, as disadvantaged youth became for a while the protagonists of the new Tunisia, such a 
reconfiguration seemed at hand. But the return to marginality of Tunisian youth in the post-
revolutionary political landscape showed how the transformation of a narrative has only indirect 
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consequences on the transformation of reality. The ambiguity that allowed Tunisian rappers to play 
with the Tunisian social imaginary was also the main limit of their symbolic work. The quest for 
dignity and social recognition was far from over. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
